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Amici Serena Mayeri, Melissa Murray, and Reva
Siegel are professors of constitutional law and
equality law. They submit this brief to identify and
explain the equal protection principles that support
Respondents’ position and afford an independent basis
on which to affirm the judgment below. 1

er
r

Serena Mayeri is Professor of Law and History at
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School;
Melissa Murray is Frederick I. and Grace Stokes
Professor of Law at New York University School of
Law; and Reva Siegel is Nicholas deB. Katzenbach
Professor of Law at Yale Law School. 2
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

tn
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The fundamental right at stake in this case
matters to millions of Americans—not only to those
who choose to end their pregnancies, but also to those
who make life decisions secure in the understanding
that they could make that choice if necessary. One in
four women of child-bearing age in this country will
have an abortion. They represent every race, religion,

All parties have consented to the filing of this brief. No counsel
for a party authored this brief in whole or in part, and no party
or counsel for a party made a monetary contribution intended to
fund its preparation or submission. No person other than amici
or amici’s counsel made a monetary contribution to the
preparation or submission of this brief.

rin

1

Amici join this brief as individuals; institutional affiliation is
noted for informational purposes only and does not indicate
endorsement by institutional employers of the positions
advocated in this brief.
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ev

socioeconomic background, and more. 3 They often are
already raising children themselves. And because our
society provides such inadequate infrastructure for
families and so little support for caregivers,
increasingly, those who decide to end their
pregnancies are living in poverty. 4

ot

pe
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HB 1510 impermissibly burdens the constitutional
right to liberty and bodily autonomy—in direct
violation of this Court’s precedent in Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113 (1973), and Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833
(1992). See Resp. Br. 2-3, 12-15. But HB 1510 also
violates
another
fundamental
constitutional
guarantee—the right to equal protection under the
law. See id. at 36-41. As amici explain in this brief, the
Equal Protection Clause supplies an additional,
independent basis for the constitutional right to an
abortion, and it forbids states like Mississippi from
trampling on that right by passing laws like HB 1510.

See Rachel K. Jones & Jenna Jerman, Population Group
Abortion Rates and Lifetime Incidence of Abortion: United States,
2008-2014, 107 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1904, 1907 (2017) (finding
that “an estimated 23.7% of women aged 15 to 44 years in 2014
will have an abortion by age 45”); see also Patrick T. Brown,
Catholics Are Just as Likely to Get an Abortion as Other U.S.
Women. Why?, AMERICA (Jan. 24, 2018), https://www.
americamagazine.org/politics-society/2018/01/24/catholics-arejust-likely-get-abortion-other-us-women-why.

rin

tn

3

See, e.g., Sabrina Tavernise, Why Women Getting Abortions
Now Are More Likely to Be Poor, N.Y. TIMES (July 9, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/09/us/abortion-accessinequality.html (“Half of all women who got an abortion in 2014
lived in poverty, double the share from 1994 … .”).
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Under this Court’s equal protection jurisprudence,
laws that classify on the basis of sex—including laws
that regulate pregnancy—are subject to heightened
scrutiny. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 53334 (1996) (“Virginia”); see also Nev. Dep’t of Hum.
Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 728-34 (2003). To survive
heightened scrutiny, the State of Mississippi must
offer an “exceedingly persuasive justification” for its
sex-based classification: specifically, it must show that
its decision to regulate by sex-discriminatory means is
substantially related to the achievement of important
governmental objectives. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 531-33.
In making that showing, the State may “not rely on
overbroad generalizations about the different talents,
capacities, or preferences of males and females,” nor
may sex classifications “be used, as they once were, to
create or perpetuate the legal, social, and economic
inferiority of women.” Id. at 533-34 (internal citation
omitted). HB 1510 does not pass constitutional muster
under this standard.

Pr

ep
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ot

Mississippi has enacted HB 1510 to “protect[] the
life of the unborn” and to “protect[] the health of
women.” See H.B. 1510 § 1(2)(b)(i)-(v), 2018 Leg., Reg.
Sess. (Miss. 2018) (citations omitted). With certain
narrow exceptions, the statute prohibits physicians
from performing “an abortion” on a “maternal patient”
after 15 weeks—singling out a pregnant woman and
imposing on her the role of mother. See id. § 1(4). But
the State denies the enormity of this imposition by
expressly claiming that coercing motherhood, over a
woman’s objection, protects the woman in addition to
any fetal life she may carry. See id. § 1(2)(b)(ii)-(v).
The statute’s paternalist justifications derive from
“overbroad generalizations,” Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533,
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about women as destined for motherhood that date
back to nineteenth-century anti-abortion campaigns.
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Relying on these antiquated sex-role stereotypes,
Mississippi assumed it could fulfill both of its
important objectives (protecting fetal life and women’s
health) by prohibiting abortion after 15 weeks.
Because the State relied so heavily on sex-role
stereotypes to achieve its two ends, it failed to explore
the many less discriminatory and noncoercive ways to
reduce abortion and to protect the life and health of
women and future generations—such as by providing
appropriate and effective sex education or assisting
those who wish to bear children.

rin
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ot

pe

For these reasons, Mississippi has failed to offer
an “exceedingly persuasive justification” for forcing a
woman to continue pregnancy. Id. at 531. HB 1510
instead enforces a sex-based and coercive
classification that “perpetuate[s] the legal, social, and
economic inferiority of women.” Id. at 534. Although
people of all gender identities may become pregnant,
seek abortions, or bear children, see Resp. Br. 13 n.3,
this
brief
focuses
on
the
constitutionally
impermissible sex-role judgments about women that
historically undergird laws regulating abortion, see
infra Part II, including HB 1510. See, e.g., Miss. H.B.
1510 § 1(2) (using language such as “maternal patient”
and “women”); see also infra n.13 (reporting on debate
among State legislators about the Mississippi women
on whom the State’s abortion regulations focus). 5
Laws that discriminate on the basis of pregnancy can involve
various forms of sex-based discrimination, as this Court has
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This brief proceeds in four parts. First, amici
demonstrate that, under this Court’s existing
precedent, laws that regulate pregnancy, like HB
1510, are sex classifications subject to heightened
scrutiny. Second, amici explain how HB 1510’s
attempt to protect both women’s health and fetal life
violates settled equal protection principles by relying
on archaic notions about a woman’s social role. Third,
amici show that Mississippi relied on these
impermissible assumptions to enact HB 1510’s
regulation on abortion and, in fact, rejected numerous
other less discriminatory means of protecting women’s
health and fetal life. And fourth, amici explain why
attempts to justify HB 1510 on equality grounds are
meritless.
I.

pe

ARGUMENT

HB 1510 VIOLATES THE
PROTECTION CLAUSE

EQUAL

ot

A. This Court’s Precedents Recognize
That Equality Principles Underlie the
Constitutional Right to an Abortion

acknowledged. Cf. Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731,
1744 (2020) (“In Phillips, the employer could have accurately
spoken of its policy as one based on ‘motherhood.’ In much the
same way, today’s employers might describe their actions as
motivated by their employees’ homosexuality or transgender
status.”).

Pr

ep

rin

tn

The right to make decisions about whether to end
a pregnancy is grounded in both the Due Process and
Equal Protection Clauses. In Casey, this Court
acknowledged that women’s talent, capacity, and right
“to participate equally in the economic and social life
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of the Nation” is dependent on “their ability to control
their reproductive lives.” 505 U.S. at 856. Indeed,
because of the physical, emotional, spiritual,
economic, and social stakes of pregnancy and
motherhood, the State cannot “insist, without more,
upon its own vision of the woman’s role, however
dominant that vision has been in the course of our
history and of our culture. The destiny of the woman
must be shaped to a large extent on her own
conception of her spiritual imperatives and her place
in society.” Id. at 852; see also Gonzales v. Carhart, 550
U.S. 124, 172 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(“[L]egal challenges to undue restrictions on abortion
procedures … center on a woman’s autonomy to
determine her life’s course, and thus to enjoy equal
citizenship … .”). 6

rin

tn

ot

And just last Term, Justice Sotomayor recognized
the equality interests at stake in accessing abortion.
Justice Sotomayor observed that “[t]his country’s laws
have long singled out abortions for more onerous
treatment than other medical procedures that carry
similar or greater risks,” imposing “an unnecessary,
irrational, and unjustifiable undue burden on women
seeking to exercise their right to choose.” FDA v. Am.
Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 141 S. Ct. 578,
585 (2021) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citing
Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 172 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)).

Cf. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 575 (2003) (“Equality of
treatment and the due process right to demand respect for
conduct protected by the substantive guarantee of liberty are
linked in important respects, and a decision on the latter point
advances both interests.”).
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Those undue burdens are often most severe for lowincome women and women of color. Id. at 582.
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Accordingly, Justices of this Court have long
acknowledged the fundamental equality principles
that underlie the constitutional right to an abortion.
Similarly, and over time, the Court has applied its
prohibition on discriminatory sex-based classifications
to laws regulating pregnancy. As amici explain in
further detail below, HB 1510 violates those equality
principles by imposing an unjustified and profoundly
dangerous sex-based restriction on a woman’s right to
control her own reproductive life. 7

pe

B. Pregnancy Regulations Are Sex-Based
Classifications Subject to Heightened
Scrutiny

ot

Throughout much of American history, belief in
traditional gender roles has shaped the Nation’s laws,
including the assumptions that “a woman is, and
should remain, ‘the center of home and family life,’”
and that “‘a proper discharge of [a woman’s] maternal
Even before Casey, prominent legal scholars recognized that the
abortion right is also protected by the Constitution’s equality
guarantees. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 928 & n.4 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring in part) (observing that the “assumption—that
women can simply be forced to accept the ‘natural’ status and
incidents of motherhood—appears to rest upon a conception of
women’s role that has triggered the protection of the Equal
Protection Clause” and citing scholarship); see also Serena
Mayeri, Undue-ing Roe: Constitutional Conflict and Political
Polarization in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, in REPRODUCTIVE
RIGHTS AND JUSTICE STORIES 150-52 (Melissa Murray, Katherine
Shaw & Reva B. Siegel, eds. 2019) (describing role of sex equality
principles in academic and judicial discourse leading up to
Casey).
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functions … justif[ies] [protective] legislation,’” Hibbs,
538 U.S. at 729 (third alteration added) (citing Hoyt v.
Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 62 (1961), and Muller v. Oregon,
208 U.S. 412, 422 (1908)). Those sex-role stereotypes
led three members of this Court to insist that “[t]he
paramount destiny and mission of woman are to fulfil
the noble and benign offices of wife and mother. This
is the law of the Creator.” Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S.
(16 Wall.) 130, 141 (1872) (Bradley, J., joined by
Swayne and Field, JJ., concurring in judgment)
(upholding a state’s denial of a law license to a woman
because of her sex).
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Fifty years ago, this Court changed course and
began to strike down sex-based state action that
enforced these traditional gender stereotypes as
unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause.
See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971); Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684-85 (1973) (plurality
opinion) (citing Bradwell as evidence of the Nation’s
“long and unfortunate history of sex discrimination”).
The Court did not initially give a clear account of how
pregnancy-based regulations perpetuate these
stereotypes. See Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496
n.20 (1974). But as the Court gained experience
interpreting the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of
1978, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2018), it began to explain
how certain laws regulating pregnancy could be based
on impermissible sex-role stereotypes, see Cal. Fed.
Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 289-90
(1987) (Marshall, J.) (upholding a state law
mandating a reasonable, unpaid pregnancy disability
leave as consistent with the Pregnancy Discrimination
Act and Title VII because it “promotes equal
employment opportunity” and “does not reflect archaic
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or stereotypic notions about pregnancy and the
abilities of pregnant workers”).
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The Court thereafter made clear that equal
protection principles apply with equal force to
pregnancy-based classifications. Justice Ginsburg’s
landmark decision in United States v. Virginia
recognized that pregnancy-based regulations, too, are
sex classifications subject to scrutiny under the Equal
Protection Clause. See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533-34
(citing Cal. Fed., 479 U.S. at 289). In Virginia, the
Court held that sex classifications cannot be justified
by physical differences between men and women. The
Court affirmed that the Constitution’s equality
guarantees extend to women as men’s equals,
regardless of any “inherent differences” between the
sexes. Those “[i]nherent differences,” the Court
explained, “remain cause for celebration, but not for
denigration of the members of either sex or for
artificial constraints on an individual’s opportunity.”
Id.
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Not every sex classification, the Court reasoned,
was constitutionally infirm. Sex classifications that
“promot[e] equal employment opportunity” or
“advance [the] full development of the talent and
capacities of our Nation’s people”—like the state law
establishing unpaid pregnancy disability leave at
issue in Cal. Fed.—are permissible. Id. at 533 (quoting
Cal. Fed., 479 U.S. at 289 (first alteration in original)).
But the Court in Virginia held that the Constitution’s
guarantee of equal protection means that sex
“classifications may not be used, as they once were …
to create or perpetuate the legal, social, and economic
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inferiority of women.” Id. at 534 (internal citation
omitted).
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Seven years later, Chief Justice Rehnquist
elaborated on Virginia’s logic, further confirming that
the Equal Protection Clause applied to laws
regulating pregnancy. In Hibbs, the Court held that
Congress could enact the Family and Medical Leave
Act to remedy and prevent inequality in the provision
of family leave because historically, “ideology about
women’s roles” had been used to justify discrimination
against women particularly when they were “mothers
or mothers-to-be.” 538 U.S. at 736 (citation omitted).

Taken together, Virginia and Hibbs establish that
laws
regulating
pregnancy
are
sex-based
classifications that violate the Equal Protection
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Hibbs
made
clear
that
pregnancy-based
regulations anchored in archaic stereotypes about
gender roles can violate the Equal Protection Clause.
As Chief Justice Rehnquist put it, the “differential
[maternity and paternity] leave policies were not
attributable to any differential physical needs of men
and women, but rather to the pervasive sex-role
stereotype that caring for family members is women’s
work.” Id. at 731. Laws perpetuating such sex-role
stereotypes injured women and men. And “[t]hese
mutually reinforcing stereotypes,” the Chief Justice
recognized, “created a self-fulfilling cycle of
discrimination that forced women to continue to
assume the role of primary family caregiver.” Id. at
736 (“Because employers continued to regard the
family as the woman’s domain, they often denied men
similar accommodations or discouraged them from
taking leave.”).
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Clause when they are rooted in sex-role stereotypes
that injure or subordinate. See Reva B. Siegel, The
Pregnant Citizen, from Suffrage to the Present, 19TH
AMENDMENT SPECIAL EDITION GEO. L.J. 167, 189-211
(2020); see also id. at 208 & n.229 (explaining
Geduldig’s status after Virginia and Hibbs).
C. Because HB 1510 Regulates Pregnancy,
It Must Satisfy Heightened Scrutiny

er
r

HB 1510 singles out pregnant women for coercive
regulation. By its terms, the law is designed to deprive
women, and not men, of their right to make choices
about whether or not to have children.
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Because Mississippi has chosen “discriminatory
means” to protect health and life, the State must
satisfy heightened scrutiny by offering an
“exceedingly persuasive” justification for its choice of
means that does not rely on “overbroad
generalizations” about the differences between sexes.
Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533. In scrutinizing sex-based
state action for impermissible sex stereotyping, the
Virginia standard examines the law’s historical
context and the State’s decision-making in a larger
policy context to ascertain whether the State’s sexbased classification is being used “to create or
perpetuate the legal, social, and economic inferiority
of women.” Id. at 534. 8

See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 535-40 (determining from historical
context that stereotyped beliefs about sex roles originating in
nineteenth-century ideas about women’s physical and
reproductive fragility underpinned the exclusion of women from
VMI); id. at 539 (determining from policy context that VMI’s
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MISSISSIPPI’S JUSTIFICATIONS FOR
HB
1510
ARE
INEXTRICABLY
INTERTWINED WITH OUTDATED
STEREOTYPES ABOUT WOMEN

pe

II.
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HB 1510 does not satisfy heightened scrutiny for at
least two reasons. First, considered in historical
context, the State’s legislative findings reflect “ancient
notions about women’s place in the family and under
the Constitution—ideas that have long since been
discredited.” Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 185 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting). See infra Part II. Second, relying on these
traditional sex roles, the State assumed it could
protect fetal life and the health of women by
prohibiting abortion after 15 weeks. But gripped by
those stereotyped beliefs, Mississippi failed to adopt
many alternative, less discriminatory means of
reducing abortion and supporting those who seek to
raise children. See infra Part III.

ot

Petitioners insist that Roe and Casey “shackle
States to a view of the facts that is decades out of
date.” Pet. Br. 4. To the contrary, Mississippi’s own
logic and its laws are anchored in the past.

rin
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Today, as in the past, advocates of laws like HB
1510 argue that restricting abortion will protect fetal
life and protect women—all while denying that
limiting abortion access risks hurting women. 9 See

rejection of coeducation in 1986 did not reflect “any
Commonwealth policy evenhandedly to advance diverse
educational options”).

In the 1990s, in response to public unease with arguments
against abortion that ignored or attacked women, advocates
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Miss. H.B. 1510 § 1(2)(b)(i) (finding that banning
abortion protects fetal life); id. § 1(2)(b)(ii)-(v) (finding
that banning abortion protects women).
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These justifications are not new. The nineteenthcentury anti-abortion campaign, too, claimed that
regulating abortion would protect women’s physical
and psychological health. The anti-abortion campaign
shows how a call to protect a pregnant woman’s health
can function as an effort to enforce a woman’s role as
mother.
Most
importantly,
the
campaign
demonstrates how seemingly benign concerns can be
deeply entangled with wholly unconstitutional
reasons for compelling a woman to bear a child. See
Reva Siegel, Reasoning from the Body: A Historical
Perspective on Abortion Regulation and Questions of
Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L. REV. 261, 280-323 (1992)
(showing how nineteenth-century doctors argued that
banning abortion would protect fetal life, protect a
woman’s health, enforce wives’ marital duties, and
control the relative birthrates of “native” and
immigrant populations, in order to preserve the
demographic character of the nation); see also infra
Part IV.

Pr

ep

rin

began to emphasize that restricting abortion not only protects
fetal life, but also protects women’s psychological and physical
health. See Reva B. Siegel, Why Restrict Abortion? Expanding the
Frame on June Medical, 2020 SUP. CT. REV. (forthcoming 2021)
(manuscript at 20-33), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=3799645 (explaining how anti-abortion movement’s
“pro-woman and pro-life” claims implicitly and expressly appeal
to the sex role-based belief that what is best for children is best
for the mother’s health).
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A. Historical Context Illustrates That Sex
Stereotypes Are Interwoven into
Abortion Restrictions Like HB 1510

During this same time, doctors further justified
controlling women’s roles by asserting women’s
incompetence to make their own decisions about sex
and
childbearing.
Because
they
understood
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In the nineteenth century, the physician who led
the campaign to ban abortion, Dr. Horatio Storer,
claimed that childbearing was “the end for which
[married women] are physiologically constituted and
for which they are destined by nature.” See HORATIO
STORER, WHY NOT? A BOOK FOR EVERY WOMAN 75-76
(1866); JAMES C. MOHR, ABORTION IN AMERICA: THE
ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL POLICY, 1800–
1900, 78, 89, 148 (1978) (recounting Storer’s role in
persuading Americans to ban abortion). According to
Storer, avoiding this pre-ordained biological and social
role would lead to a woman’s physical and social ruin.
See STORER, supra, at 37 (“[A]ny infringement of
[natural laws] must necessarily cause derangement,
disaster, or ruin.”); H.S. POMEROY, THE ETHICS OF
MARRIAGE 97 (1888) (“Interference with Nature so
that she may not accomplish the production of healthy
human beings is a physiological sin of the most
heinous
sort … .”).
The
American
Medical
Association’s 1871 Report on Criminal Abortion
denounced a woman who ended a pregnancy: “She
becomes unmindful of the course marked out for her
by Providence, she overlooks the duties imposed on
her by the marriage contract.” D.A. O’Donnell & W.L.
Atlee, Report on Criminal Abortion, 22 TRANSACTIONS
AM. MED. ASS’N 239, 241 (1871).
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childbearing as the “end for which [women] are
psychologically constituted and for which they are
destined by nature,” anti-abortion advocates claimed
that termination of pregnancy is “disastrous to a
woman’s mental, moral, and physical well-being.”
STORER, supra, at 75-76. The notion that interrupting
a pregnancy produced feminine hysteria followed
neatly from the premise that women lack decisional
capacity to choose to avoid motherhood. See E.P.
Christian, The Pathological Consequences Incident to
Induced Abortion, 2 DETROIT REV. MED. & PHARMACY
145, 146 (1867) (noting that “violence against the
physiological laws of gestation” would cause a “severe
and grievous penalty” because of “the intimate
relation between the nervous and uterine systems
manifested in the various and frequent nervous
disorders arising from uterine derangements”).
Further, the choice to avoid motherhood was believed
to confer “a moral as well as a physical taint” that
“stamps its effects indelibly on the constitution of the
female.” J.J. Mulheron, Foeticide: A Paper Read Before
the Wayne County Medical Society, 10 PENINSULAR J.
MED. 385, 390 (1874).
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And just as women’s minds were supposedly
irrevocably and deleteriously affected by abortion, so
too were their bodies. Physicians claimed that
abortion would “insidiously undermine[]” women’s
reproductive organs, and “permanently incapacitate[]
[women] for conception.” STORER, supra, at 50. A
woman who has an abortion “destroys her health …
[and] sooner or later comes upon the hands of the
physician suffering with uterine disease.” O.S. Phelps,
Criminal Abortion: Read Before the Calhoun County
Medical Society, 1 DETROIT LANCET 725, 728 (1878).
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According to anti-abortion advocates, these and other
health issues were a “direct result of this interference
with nature’s laws.” L.D. Griswold et al., Additional
Report from the Select Committee to Whom Was
Referred S.B. No. 285, 1867 OHIO SENATE J. APPENDIX
233, 234 (emphasis added). It should come as little
surprise that “[s]tatements hostile to the woman’s
rights movement appeared in many of the antiabortion tracts penned by America’s doctors and their
supporters.” Siegel, Reasoning from the Body, supra,
at 303; see generally id. at 302-14. 10
B. HB 1510 Rests on Modern Expressions
of Outdated Sex-Role Stereotypes

ot

pe

HB 1510 recites Mississippi’s interests in banning
abortion to protect fetal life and women’s health. See
Miss. H.B. 1510 § 1(2)(b)(i)-(ii). Although the State
does not employ nineteenth-century rhetoric in its
legislative findings, its asserted justifications for HB
1510 are a modern twist on the same old sex-role
Emphasizing the importance of a woman’s right to “voluntary
motherhood” (that is, to oppose her husband’s sexual advances),
abolitionist and suffragist Lucy Stone remarked, “[i]t is very little
to me to have the right to vote, to own property, … if I may not
keep my body, and its uses, in my absolute right.” Id. at 305
(quoting Letter from Lucy Stone to Antoinette Brown (Blackwell)
(July 11, 1855), quoted in ELIZABETH CAZDEN, ANTOINETTE
BROWN BLACKWELL: A BIOGRAPHY 100 (1983)). Doctors leading
the nineteenth-century campaign against abortion attacked
arguments for voluntary motherhood on the grounds that
recognizing a wife’s right to refuse her husband’s sexual advances
would make marriage a relation of “legalized prostitution.” See
id. at 308-14. This debate over women’s sexual and reproductive
autonomy offered competing perspectives on the practice of
abortion.
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stereotypes that animated anti-abortion campaigners
in centuries past.
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Like nineteenth-century physicians, Mississippi
assumes that women are incapable of deciding for
themselves how to balance the comparative health
risks and emotional burdens of continued pregnancy,
childbirth, and abortion. For instance, the legislative
findings in HB 1510 declare that “[a]bortion carries
significant physical and psychological risks to the
maternal patient,” including “depression; anxiety;
substance abuse; and other emotional or psychological
problems.” Id. § 1(2)(b)(ii), (iv). The State Legislature
further asserts that the “medical, emotional, and
psychological consequences of abortion are serious and
can be lasting.” Id. § 1(2)(b)(v) (internal quotation
marks omitted); see Pet. Br. 8.

There is a second, even more fundamental, sex-role
assumption underlying HB 1510. As the Court in
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That unsupported assertion reflects the same
stereotypical view of women’s fragile, maternal psyche
espoused
by
nineteenth-century
anti-abortion
advocates. Meanwhile, the mental and emotional
stress of pregnancy, childbirth, and caring for
children—in an economy that discriminates against
mothers
and
pregnant
people—go
entirely
unmentioned. See Stephen Benard et al., Cognitive
Bias and the Motherhood Penalty, 59 HASTINGS L.J.
1359, 1359-61 (2008). Rather than leave judgments
about how to balance these risks to women,
Mississippi has decided to make the decision for itself,
banning abortions after 15 weeks on the ground that
doing so is in the psychological best interests of the
“maternal patient.” Miss. H.B. 1510 § 1(2)(b)(ii).
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Virginia recounted, it was commonplace for
nineteenth-century doctors to argue that women who
violated sex roles (e.g., by pursuing higher education)
risked jeopardizing their reproductive physiology. See
Virginia, 518 U.S. at 536-37 & n.9. The physicians in
Storer’s campaign repeatedly warned of the litany of
health harms that would attend a woman’s deviation
from her reproductive destiny. See supra Part II.A.
The reasoning Mississippi offers for banning abortion
after 15 weeks—to protect the health of the “maternal
patient,” Miss. H.B. 1510 § 1(2)(b)(ii), (iii), echoes the
sex-role assumptions of the nineteenth-century antiabortion campaign: a pregnant woman’s “health” will
suffer if she deviates from her natural maternal role.
But whatever health risks may be associated with
abortion (on one hand) and bearing children in
Mississippi (on the other), the choice of whether to
assume those risks and how to weigh them belongs to
women and not the State.
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Moreover, when Mississippi claims that abortion in
the second trimester is more dangerous than
childbirth, id. § 1(2)(b)(iii), it appears to be making an
empirical claim. In fact, Mississippi is appealing to the
traditional sex-role assumption that a woman will
suffer if she chooses to avoid her natural maternal
role. If its claim were genuinely based in science, the
State would address the scientific finding that
childbirth is many times more dangerous than
abortion—as this Court and others have recognized.
See Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct.
2292, 2315 (2016) (observing that “[n]ationwide,
childbirth is 14 times more likely than abortion to
result in death”); Siegel, Why Restrict Abortion?, supra
(manuscript at 49-50 & n.259) (describing Judge
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Richard Posner and others criticizing an anti-abortion
expert for persistently, and falsely, claiming that
abortion is more dangerous than pregnancy). See
generally Elizabeth G. Raymond & David A. Grimes,
The Comparative Safety of Legal Induced Abortion
and Childbirth in the United States, 119 OBSTETRICS
& GYNECOLOGY 215 (2012) (concluding that the risk of
death associated with childbirth is approximately 14
times higher than with abortion). See infra Part III.
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While the justifications undergirding HB 1510 may
superficially be couched in the language of health and
science, even a cursory examination of the relevant
historical context reveals that the State’s
justifications are just re-packaged versions of the
same sex-role stereotypes used by nineteenth-century
anti-abortion advocates. Thus, HB 1510 carries forth
a long and unfortunate tradition of state-sponsored
paternalism, in which the coercive control of a woman
is justified as an act of benign solicitude. See Frontiero,
411 U.S. at 684 (explaining that traditional forms of
sex discrimination were “rationalized by an attitude of
‘romantic paternalism’ which, in practical effect, put
women not on a pedestal, but in a cage”).
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To be clear, Mississippi may surely protect the
health of women and the next generation, but in
seeking to achieve these important ends, the State
may “not rely on overbroad generalizations about the
different talents, capacities, or preferences of males
and females.” Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533. Those are
precisely the assumptions about women on which HB
1510 relies in presenting coercion as protection. These
well-worn sex-role stereotypes may be archaic, but
they are anything but quaint: when these sex-role
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stereotypes are enforced through a law restricting
abortion, they can deprive a woman of her autonomy,
her job, her health, and even her life.
RELIANCE ON IMPERMISSIBLE SEX
STEREOTYPES LED MISSISSIPPI TO
FOREGO LESS DISCRIMINATORY
MEANS TO ACHIEVE ITS GOALS OF
PROTECTING WOMEN’S HEALTH
AND FETAL LIFE

ev

III.
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Mississippi employed sex-discriminatory means to
achieve its goals of protecting women’s health and
protecting fetal life. Virginia requires the State to
demonstrate that its choice of sex-discriminatory
means is “substantially related to the achievement of”
important government ends, by advancing an
“exceedingly persuasive justification” that does not
rely on sex-role stereotypes. See Virginia, 518 U.S. at
533-34. It cannot make that showing here.

tn

ot

Mississippi could have employed many policy
means to reduce abortion and protect the health of
women and children. Relying on available federal
funds, it could have provided appropriate and effective
sex education and expanded access to contraception; it
could have expanded access to health insurance and
provided assistance to needy families. But instead,
Mississippi has restricted abortion access.
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In its belief that banning abortions at 15 weeks
would protect both the fetus and the health of the
pregnant woman—a belief that is itself rooted in
stereotypes about women’s roles as child bearers
before all else—Mississippi pushed women who seek
to end pregnancies into harm’s way by compelling
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pregnancy and childbirth, when the State could have
pursued its ends by alternate, less discriminatory
means. The State singled out women who sought to
end pregnancy instead of pursuing its ends by aiding
those who want to avoid parenthood and supporting
those who want to raise children.

er
r

Because Mississippi so heavily relied on sex-role
stereotypes to enact a law that singled out and harmed
women, the State has not demonstrated that its ban
on abortion after 15 weeks is “substantially related” to
important ends. Instead, the State’s reliance on sexrole stereotypes led it to protect through coercion,
which in turn “perpetuate[s] the legal, social, and
economic inferiority of women.” Id.

pe

A. Abortion Restrictions Like HB 1510 Do
Not Protect Women But Rather Expose
Them to Harm

ot

Mississippi seeks to protect women and fetal life by
banning abortion after 15 weeks. But the ban it has
adopted to achieve those ends actually jeopardizes,
rather than protects, the health of women.

The risks of compelled pregnancy are considerable,
in a state where the maternal mortality rate is
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Not only does HB 1510 take from women control
over their life decisions, as nineteenth-century doctors
preached, it subjects women to myriad health harms
in a State where the social safety net makes grossly
inadequate provision for women or children. See
Michele Goodwin, Banning Abortion Doesn’t Protect
Women’s Health, N.Y. TIMES (July 9, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/09/opinion/roeabortion-supreme-court.html.
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alarmingly high, averaging 33.2 deaths for every
100,000 live births. MISS. STATE DEP’T OF HEALTH,
MISS. MATERNAL MORTALITY REPORT 10 (2019),
https://msdh.ms.gov/msdhsite/index.cfm/31,8127,299,
pdf/Maternal_Mortality_2019_amended.pdf.
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Pregnancy in Mississippi presents particular risks
for Black women, who accounted for “nearly 80
percent of pregnancy-related cardiac deaths” between
2013 and 2016. Id. at 16. The pregnancy-related
mortality rate for Black women was nearly three times
the rate for white women. Id. at 12 (ranging from 51.9
to 61.4 deaths per 100,000 live births compared to 18.9
to 36.7 deaths per 100,000 live births).

pe

Forcing pregnancy and childbirth onto women
against their will places their health and lives at risk.
HB 1510, therefore, does not promote—let alone
substantially relate to—Mississippi’s claimed goal of
promoting women’s health.

ot

B. Mississippi
Repeatedly
Rejected
Nondiscriminatory Alternatives That
Would Protect the Health of Women
and Families
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Mississippi had many policy alternatives for
protecting the health of women and families. But in
considering the many options before it, the State has
consistently rejected noncoercive opportunities to
improve the health of mothers and infants, even
declining federal monies available to support these
ends. The consequences are especially dire for Black
mothers and infants. Despite the increased risks they
face in Mississippi, the State has repeatedly declined
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to enact policies that could improve their health and
wellbeing.
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1. Access to regular health care and checkups could
reduce maternal deaths by up to 60%. Emily E.
Petersen et al., Vital Signs: Pregnancy-Related
Deaths, United States, 2011–2015, and Strategies for
Prevention, 13 States, 2013–2017, 68 MORBIDITY AND
MORTALITY WEEKLY REPORT 423 (May 10, 2019). Lack
of care can be deadly for newborns—the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services found that
newborns whose mothers had no early prenatal care
are almost five times more likely to die. See Dep’t of
Health & Hum. Servs. Off. on Women’s Health,
PRENATAL CARE, https://www.womenshealth.gov/a-ztopics/prenatal-care (Apr. 1, 2019).
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Yet ensuring access to health care is largely
dependent on income and insurance coverage, and
Medicaid expansion under the Affordable Care Act
(ACA) has been shown to reliably improve insurance
access. Jamie R. Daw et al., Medicaid Expansion
Improved Perinatal Insurance Continuity for LowIncome Women, 39 HEALTH AFFS. 1531 (Sept. 2020).
Increasing access to Medicaid could not only reduce
maternal and infant deaths, but could also give a
pregnant person lacking alternative health insurance
the security to continue an unplanned pregnancy and
to cope with delivery and postpartum care.
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Mississippi, however, has refused to expand
Medicaid under the ACA, compromising health care
access for under-resourced Mississippians. Sarah
Varney, How Obamacare Went South in Mississippi,
THE ATLANTIC (Nov. 4, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.
com/health/archive/2014/11/how-obamacare-went-
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south-in-mississippi/382313/. This policy decision left
an estimated 138,000 otherwise eligible people
without health coverage and deprived the state of an
estimated $1.2 billion in federal funds.
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Ironically, after signing HB 1510, then-Governor
Phil Bryant announced that he was “committed to
making Mississippi the safest place in America for an
unborn child, and this bill will help us achieve that
goal.” Jenny Gathright, Mississippi Governor Signs
Nation’s Toughest Abortion Ban into Law, NAT’L PUB.
RADIO (Mar. 19, 2018), https://www.npr.org/sections/
thetwo-way/2018/03/19/595045249/mississippigovernor-signs-nations-toughest-abortion-ban-intolaw. But, in reality, Mississippi’s refusal to accept
federal funding to provide health care for its residents
directly contributes to its startlingly high infant and
maternal mortality rates, especially in communities of
color. 11
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2. Lack of financial resources is among the most
common reasons that women provide for ending a
pregnancy. See M. Antonia Biggs et al.,
Understanding Why Women Seek Abortions in the US,
13 BMC WOMEN’S HEALTH 29 (2013), https://
www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3729671.
The Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF)
program, which provides grants to support low-income
families with children, enables Mississippi to channel

In 2018, the State ranked worst in the nation for infant
mortality, with a rate of 8.43 infant deaths per 1,000 live births.
MISS. STATE DEP’T OF HEALTH, INFANT MORTALITY REPORT 1
(2019), https://msdh.ms.gov/msdhsite/_static/resources/8431.pdf.
Black infants constitute most infant deaths in Mississippi and
are almost twice as likely to die as white infants. Id. at 8.
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federal monies to its low-income residents.
Participating in TANF offers a clear, noncoercive
means of empowering people to choose to continue
pregnancy with resources to support dependent family
members.
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Remarkably, despite this opportunity to support at
least some women in choosing to continue pregnancies
and to reduce the nation’s highest child poverty rate,
in 2019, Mississippi spent only about five percent of
its TANF funds on direct assistance to families. Ali
Safawi, Mississippi Raises TANF Benefits but More
Improvements Needed, Especially in South, CTR. FOR
BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES (May 4, 2021),
https://www.cbpp.org/blog/mississippi-raises-tanfbenefits-but-more-improvements-needed-especiallyin-south. And the number of poor families receiving
TANF has declined precipitously: less than 3,000
families received the maximum benefit of $170 per
month by 2021, down from 23,700 families in 1999. See
Anna Wolfe, Mississippi Found ‘Absurd’ Ways to
Spend Welfare on Anything but the Poor. These Bills
Would Put More Money into Families’ Pockets, MISS.
TODAY (Jan. 29, 2021), https://mississippitoday.org/
2021/01/29/mississippi-found-absurd-ways-to-spendwelfare-on-anything-but-the-poor-these-bills-wouldput-more-money-into-families-pockets. 12 Until 2021,

TANF money has also been blatantly wasted in the State.
Beginning in 2016, the director of the Mississippi Department of
Human Services spearheaded the “largest public embezzlement
scheme in state history.” Anna Wolfe, Embattled Welfare Group
Paid $5 Million for New USM Volleyball Center, MISS. TODAY
(Feb. 27, 2020), https://mississippitoday.org/2020/02/27/welfareprogram-paid-5-million-for-new-volleyball-center/. Millions of
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Mississippi maintained the lowest TANF benefit
levels in the nation, refusing for decades even to adjust
for inflation. Id.
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Moreover, many women who decide to end a
pregnancy are poor and low-income mothers who fear
that having another child will compromise their
ability to provide for the children they already have.
Mississippi preserves policies that reinforce those
genuine concerns. For instance, the State maintains a
family cap, limiting TANF benefits for additional
children born into families that receive public
assistance. Mississippi’s family cap survives despite
evidence that these policies “harm children’s health”
and “deepen poverty,” evidence that has prompted
their repeal in many states. Teresa Wiltz, Family
Welfare Caps Lose Favor in More States, PEW
STATELINE (May 3, 2019), https://www.pewtrusts.org/
en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2019/05/03/
family-welfare-caps-lose-favor-in-more-states.

dollars meant for TANF instead were diverted to “a new
volleyball stadium, a horse ranch for a famous athlete, multimillion dollar celebrity speaking engagements, high-tech virtual
reality equipment, luxury vehicles, steakhouse dinners and even
a speeding ticket.” Wolfe, Mississippi Found ‘Absurd’ Ways to
Spend Welfare on Anything but the Poor, supra.
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3. Information about and access to contraception
lowers rates of unplanned pregnancies. But rather
than provide effective sex education and contraceptive
access, Mississippi continues to promote abstinenceonly sex education. Chris Elkins, More Than ‘Just Say
No’ Needed in Sex Ed, DAILY J. (Dec. 13, 2012),
https://www.djournal.com/opinion/other-opinionmore-than-just-say-no-needed-in-sex-ed/article_
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db4f2969-e2b8-5950-8fd7-f46d551cb742.html.
For example, instead of using federal monies to
implement comprehensive sex education at no cost to
the state, Mississippi funded a “Teen Pregnancy
Prevention
Summit”
featuring
pamphlets
discouraging the use of contraceptives because they
supposedly harm girls’ “physical[,] emotional and
spiritual well-being.” Andy Kopsa, Sex Ed Without
Condoms? Welcome to Mississippi, THE ATLANTIC
(Mar. 7, 2013), https://www.theatlantic.com/national/
archive/2013/03/sex-ed-without-condoms-welcome-tomississippi/273802; see also Alana Semuels, Sex
Education Stumbles in Mississippi, L.A. TIMES (Apr.
2, 2014) (recounting a public school sex education
curriculum which instructed students to unwrap a
piece of chocolate, pass it around the class, and
observe how dirty it became to “show that a girl is no
longer clean or valuable after she’s had sex”).
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The consequences of these policies for women’s and
children’s health are severe: Mississippi boasts some
of the nation’s highest rates of teen pregnancy,
gonorrhea, chlamydia, and syphilis. Sarah Fowler,
Mississippi Has the Highest Rate of this STD, Ranks
3rd for Two Others, MISS. CLARION LEDGER (Oct. 15,
2019),
https://www.clarionledger.com/story/news/
local/2019/10/15/gonorrhea-std-rate-mississippihighest-chlamydia-syphillis-access-to-care-factor/
3932140002/. Nevertheless, Mississippi continues to
rely on a mode of protecting women’s health and fetal
life that is rooted in impermissible sex stereotypes,
and does so by restricting access to reproductive
health care.
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Mississippi objects that Casey’s protections for
women’s decision-making “prevent[] States from
providing health benefits and protections that they
can provide in other contexts.” Pet. Br. 41-42. But
Mississippi has a wealth of policy options for reducing
the incidence of abortion in the state and protecting
women’s health. See Emily Wax-Thibodeaux & Ariana
Eunjung Cha, The Mississippi Clinic at the Center of
the Fight to End Abortion in America, THE WASH. POST
(Aug. 24, 2021) (recounting story of a young woman
receiving follow up care after abortion in the state’s
only remaining clinic who said “that because
Mississippi teaches only abstinence in public schools,
no one explained to her how to prevent pregnancy if
she had sex”).
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In short, Mississippi could provide care and
support for individuals who wish: to avoid pregnancy,
to bear children who will not languish in poverty, to
preserve their own or their children’s health, or to
safeguard their ability to provide for existing children.
Instead, Mississippi chooses to prevent women from
making the most intimate, consequential decisions for
themselves and to coerce women into giving birth
under dangerous, demeaning conditions. 13 HB 1510
thus functions more as a tool of control than as an

For a debate among white and Black Mississippi lawmakers
about the women regulated by the State’s abortion restrictions,
including remarks by Republican Sen. Joey Fillingane, cosponsor of HB 1510, see Emily Wagster Pettus, Mississippi
Considers Abortion Ban After Fetal Heartbeat, ABC NEWS, (Feb.
5,
2019),
https://abcnews.go.com/us/wirestory/mississippiconsiders-abortion-ban-fetal-heartbeat-60864978.
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expression of care for Mississippi’s women and
children. See Pet. App. 46a n.22.
IV.

HB 1510 DOES NOT
EQUALITY INTERESTS

ADVANCE
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Increasingly, those who support abortion
restrictions take the extraordinary position that laws
like HB 1510 actually promote equality under the law
by preventing abortion from being used for eugenic
purposes. In his separate concurrence in the judgment
below, Judge Ho, drawing on a concurrence by Justice
Thomas, asserts “that abortion ‘has proved to be a
disturbingly effective tool for implementing the
discriminatory preferences that undergird eugenics’”
and notes that “the current ‘abortion ratio … among
black women is nearly 3.5 times the ratio for white
women.’” Pet. App. 35a (quoting Box v. Planned
Parenthood of Ind. & Ky., Inc., 139 S. Ct. 1780, 179091 (2019) (Thomas, J., concurring)).

Without acknowledging these differences, abortion
opponents insist that, today, Roe and the
constitutional law of abortion rights are being used as
a tool of eugenic manipulation. There is a certain irony
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Such efforts to link abortion to eugenics ignore the
fundamental differences between a state-sponsored
program of eugenic regulation designed to control the
demographic character of the community and a law
protecting an individual’s decision to terminate a
pregnancy. In the former, decisional authority rests
with the state. In the latter, the state protects the
authority of an individual to make reproductive
decisions consistent with her individual beliefs and
circumstances.
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here: If there is any historical association between
abortion law and projects of demographic control, it
lies in the nineteenth-century campaign to criminalize
abortion itself.
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The nineteenth-century campaign unfolded during
an era of nativist, anti-immigrant, anti-Catholic
feeling. See ERIKA LEE, AMERICA FOR AMERICANS: A
HISTORY OF XENOPHOBIA IN THE UNITED STATES 42-44
(2019). Storer and others blamed abortion for the
differences in birth rate between “native” (i.e.,
Protestant) women and “foreign” women. See STORER,
supra, at 62-63; id. at 64-65 (observing that “abortions
are infinitely more frequent among Protestant women
than among Catholic [women]”); see also, e.g., William
McCollom, Criminal Abortion, TRANSACTIONS VT.
MED. SOC’Y 40, 42 (1865) (“Our own population seem
to have a greater aversion to the rearing of families
than … the French, the Irish and the Germans.”); L.C.
Butler, The Decadence of the American Race, 77 BOS.
MED. & SURGICAL J. 89, 93-94 (Sept. 5, 1867)
(comparing Protestant and Catholic doctrine on
abortion with attention to the relevant reproductive
rates of Protestants and Catholics). Storer tied
Protestant families’ declining size to Protestant
women exercising reproductive autonomy; he thus
sought abortion bans to increase the number of
Protestants. He questioned whether “the great
territories of the far West, just opening to civilization,
and the fertile savannas of the South” would be filled
by “our own children, or by those of aliens? This is a
question that our own women must answer; upon their
loins depends the future destiny of the nation.”
STORER, supra, at 85. His words resonated with at
least some state lawmakers enacting abortion

This preprint research paper has not been peer reviewed. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4080080

iew
ed

31

ev

restrictions. See L.D. Griswold et al., supra, at 235
(“Shall we permit our broad and fertile prairies to be
settled only by the children of aliens?”). Doctors
leading the campaign to criminalize abortion sought
to wrest control of the reproductive decisions of “our
own women” to protect fetal life, to enforce marital
roles, and to preserve the demographic character of
the nation. Siegel, Reasoning from the Body, supra, at
297-300.
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Interest in eugenics—“‘the science of improving
stock’ by giving ‘the more suitable races or strains of
blood a better chance of prevailing speedily over the
less suitable’”—became more popular in the
nineteenth and early twentieth century. DOROTHY
ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY 24, 59 (2d ed.
2017). Eugenicists argued that “society should
encourage the procreation of those of superior lineage,
while discouraging procreation among—and public
support for—those of inferior lineage.” Melissa
Murray, Race-ing Roe: Reproductive Justice, Racial
Justice, and the Battle for Roe v. Wade, 134 HARV. L.
REV. 2025, 2036-37 (2021).
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But the twentieth century eugenics movement did
not focus on abortion as a way to control the
population. It turned to laws permitting sterilization
of the “feebleminded” and “habitual criminals,” as well
as laws criminalizing miscegenation and interracial
marriage. Id. at 2037. By the mid-twentieth century,
policies of reproductive control primarily targeted
impoverished communities of color perceived as
threats to the public fisc by curtailing individuals’
ability to make decisions about their reproductive
lives. Id. at 2047.
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Mississippi’s own history is instructive. In the
1950s and 1960s, state lawmakers prescribed
sterilization as a punishment for nonmarital
childbearing. See id. at 2042 (describing 1964 Student
Nonviolent Coordinating Committee pamphlet
Genocide in Mississippi). Civil rights leader Fannie
Lou Hamer famously estimated that six in ten Black
women who gave birth in Sunflower County Hospital
during
this
period
underwent
post-partum
sterilization without their consent, and often without
their knowledge, a practice so common it was
colloquially called a “Mississippi appendectomy.”
CHANA KAI LEE, FOR FREEDOM’S SAKE: THE LIFE OF
FANNIE LOU HAMER 21-22, 80 (1999); REBECCA M.
KLUCHIN, FIT TO BE TIED: STERILIZATION AND
REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS IN AMERICA, 1950-1980 at 9394 (2009). As history makes clear, there is simply no
comparison between state policies of reproductive
control aimed at limiting birth among marginalized
groups and the individual right to make reproductive
decisions free from state coercion.
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Further, when abortion opponents point to the
incidence of abortion among minority communities as
evidence that abortion is rife with “eugenic potential,”
they ignore the “structural impediments communities
of color face in reproductive decisionmaking.” Murray,
supra, at 2090-91. For many people of color, “the
decision to terminate a pregnancy is shot through with
concerns about economic and financial insecurity,
limited
employment
options,
diminution
of
educational opportunities, and lack of access to health
care and affordable quality childcare.” Id. at 2090-91.
Efforts to associate abortion with eugenics obscure
how Mississippi’s own policy choices, by failing to
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support families, perpetuate the conditions that lead
increasing numbers of poor women and women of color
to decide to end their pregnancies. See supra Part III.
Rather than link abortion rates to the policy choices
that perpetuate poverty, opponents shift blame on to
women who make decisions about abortion in a nation
that provides scarcely any support for those who
conceive, bear, and raise children.
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For a half century, this Court has affirmed that the
Equal Protection Clause forbids the State from
imposing traditional gender roles. See also Ruth Bader
Ginsburg, Sex Equality and the Constitution: The
State of the Art, 4 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 143, 143-44
(1978). HB 1510 does just that. It discriminates on the
basis of sex, enforcing nineteenth-century sex-role
stereotypes that compel a woman to continue
pregnancy while the State foregoes alternative
nondiscriminatory means to achieve the same ends.
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In Casey, the Court explained that a pregnant
woman’s “suffering is too intimate and personal for the
State to insist, without more, upon its own vision of
the woman’s role, however dominant that vision has
been in the course of our history and our culture.”
Casey, 505 U.S. at 852. Mississippi has banned
abortion after 15 weeks to protect the life and health
of the fetus and the “maternal patient.” Miss. H.B.
1510 § 1(2)(b)(ii)-(v). The statute addresses a pregnant
woman as a mother, but in the same breath, it
deprives her of control over whether to become a
mother—all while claiming to act in the name of her
“physical and psychological” “health.” See id.
Mississippi offers no persuasive justification for its
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ready embrace of sex-based coercive means to protect
life and health when less discriminatory means were
available.
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CONCLUSION

ev

At the heart of both the Due Process Clause and
the Equal Protection Clause is the individual’s right to
be free from state imposition of traditional gender
roles. HB 1510 denies that fundamental constitutional
guarantee.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment below
should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
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